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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the design of an information-
sharing based or server-assisted anti-phishing system. 
The system follows a client-server architecture and 
makes decision based on not only client side heuristics 
but also collective information from multiple clients. 
When visiting a web site, a client side proxy, installed 
as a plug-in to a browser, decides on the legitimacy of 
the web site based on a combination of white list, black 
list and heuristics. In case the client side proxy does 
not have sufficient information to make a clear 
judgment, it reports the suspicious site to a central 
server which has access to more complete and up to 
date information and is in a much better position than 
individual clients to make informed decisions. Our 
system is designed to counter against deceptive 
phishing as well as DNS-hijack attack. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Phishing attacks have been on the rise during the 
past several years and are probably the most 
widespread Internet frauds today [1]. Phishing is the 
use of deceptive methods, e.g., using emails to lure 
recipients to a spoof web site, to fraudulently obtain 
confidential personal information from the web site 
visitors.  
The phishing problem differs from many other 
security problems in that we wish to protect users from 
themselves [2]. Phishing attacks not only exploit 
software vulnerabilities but also human vulnerabilities 
since the average skilled Internet users often do not 
understand security indicators and cannot distinguish 
between legitimate and faked web sites [3].  
Many anti-phishing techniques have been proposed 
in recent years. Most of them use white list (list of 
known safe sites) and black lists (list of known 
fraudulent sites) in detecting phishing sites and depend 
solely on information from trusted third parties to 
update the lists. In this paper we present the design of a 
new information-sharing based or server-assisted anti-
phishing system. The system employs a typical client-
server architecture. When visiting a web site, a client 
side proxy, installed as a plug-in to a browser, decides 
on the legitimacy of the web site based on a 
combination of white list, black list and heuristics. In 
case the client side proxy does not have sufficient 
information to make a clear judgment, it reports the 
suspicious site to a central server which has access to 
more complete and up to date information and 
therefore is in a much better position than individual 
clients to make informed decisions..  
Majority of existing anti-phishing systems warn 
users for potential dangerous operations. However, 
their high false positives and/or false negatives erode 
users’ trust on the systems; as a result, users normally 
ignore the warnings and continue their operations. On 
the other hand, just blocking a suspicious web site is 
usually unacceptable unless it is absolutely certain that 
the site is a phishing site. Our system incorporates the 
design principle in [4] by placing user warnings into 
the workflow, so that the user has to react to the 
warning in order to continue his/her working process.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We 
introduce related work in Section 2 and then we 
present our anti-phishing system in Section 3. We 
compare the proposed system with the existing 
schemes in Section 4 and conclude the paper in Section 
5. 
 
2. Related work 
 
Many countermeasures against phishing have been 
developed during the past several years. Here we 
provide a quick review of some the typical approaches. 
Email Filter. Email filtering is the removal of 
unwanted emails, whether it is an outbreak of a new 
virus, spam or a phishing attempt on the mail servers 
before it reaches users’ mailboxes. This approach is to 
stop phishing at the email level (e.g., [10]), since most 
current phishing attacks use broadcast email (spam) to 
lure victims to a phishing website. Email filter can 
prevent a lot of phishing emails. However, phishers are 
getting smarter. For example, they first get users 
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personal information from public places, like company 
or university web sites, and then pretend to be the 
users’ friends and send emails to them. Such emails 
look like from familiar email addresses and will not be 
filtered out.  
Security Toolbars. There are currently a dozen or so 
toolbars, such as the ones from EarthLink, eBay, 
TrustWatch, Google and IE 7 [5], which are designed 
to detect phishing attacks. Most of them are mainly 
based on white list and black lists [5]. Some also 
employ heuristics to see if a URL is similar to a well-
known URL based on information about the domain 
name or IP address block where the site is hosted [4, 
5]. White and black lists depend on timely reports of 
phishing sites. As long as a phishing site has not been 
reported, phishers may steal personal data from visitors 
to the site. Heuristics such as domain name 
comparison, URL check, web content analysis, and 
image check are also adopted to detect fraudulent web 
sites [4] but heuristics have high false positives and 
normally need to work with white and black lists. 
Web Wallet. The web wallet in [7] distinguishes 
between input of sensitive data and service usage data 
by strictly deactivating login forms in the browser. A 
user has to press a special security key whenever he 
wants to enter sensitive data. Then he types his data or 
retrieves his stored data; but before the web form is 
filled with sensitive user data, the web wallet checks if 
the current site is good enough to receive the sensitive 
data. If the current site is suspicious, the web wallet 
requires the user to explicitly indicate where he wants 
the data to go. If the user’s intended site is not the 
current site, the web wallet will show a warning to the 
user, and give him a safe path to his intended site.  
A related work is given in [10] which discusses a 
single-click approach of storing passwords in a wallet 
that may be cryptographically protected by keys saved 
on hardware tokens. To defend against malicious 
content, a browser sandbox model is used where 
unapproved web objects (e.g., unsigned content) are 
strictly blocked. 
The advantage of web wallet is that it integrates 
security questions into the user’s workflow so that its 
protection can not be ignored by the user and it reduces 
the risk of classical phishing attacks. However, the 
main problem of the web wallet is that its trusted 
analysis depends on the third parties like TRUSTe, 
Alexa, CNET. Besides, the web wallet asks users to 
press the security key first when they submit the 
sensitive information, which changes user’s work flow 
of navigation. In addition, it does not prevent attacks 
that fake the user interface of the wallet. Web wallet 
also does not provide any means to prevent DNS-
hijack attacks. 
Dynamic Security Skins. This approach is to 
visually differentiate phishing sites from the spoofed 
legitimate sites. Dynamic Security Skins [8] proposes 
to use a randomly generated visual hash to customize 
the browser window or web form elements to indicate 
the successfully authenticated sites. It presents two 
interaction techniques to prevent spoofing. First, its 
browser extension provides a trusted window in the 
browser dedicated to username and password entry. It 
uses a photographic image to create a trusted path 
between the user and its window to prevent spoofing of 
the window and of the text entry fields. Second, it 
allows a remote server to generate a unique abstract 
image for each user and each transaction. This image 
creates a “skin” that automatically customizes the 
browser window or the user interface elements in the 
content of a remote web page [8]. Dynamic Security 
Skin requires users to recognize one image and low 
entropy password, and also have the ability of 
comparing two images visually. Although it makes 
phishing attackers harder to spoof customized security 
indicator, it also gives users a tired visual task. 
Moreover, it does not solve the attacks of spoofing the 
trusted window and the visual hashes [8].  
Operating System Approaches. The Tahoma 
browser operating system for web applications is 
proposed in [12], where web applications run on a 
secure kernel. Each web site runs in an instance of the 
web browser which is isolated and restricted to 
communicate with each other by the security kernel. A 
virtual machine to counter malware phishing is 
proposed in [13] where each instance of the application 
runs in an independent virtual space. 
 
3. The proposed anti-phishing system 
 
In this section we introduce our anti-phishing 
system and describe both its static structure and 
dynamic operation. The evaluation of the system will 
be presented in the next section.  
 
3.1. Architecture 
 
The system follows a client-server architecture. The 
client side software, called web proxy, is the first line 
of defense and the origin of information. The web 
proxy is implemented as a plug-in to web browsers. 
When a user tries to navigate to a web site, the web 
proxy makes the first decision whether the site is a 
spoof site by checking the black and white lists in a 
database of the client. If the web site is not in the lists, 
the web proxy performs heuristic analysis on the 
content of the page and calculates a spoof value.  The 
proxy reports the suspicious site to a central server.  
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Upon receiving reports from clients the server puts 
the reported web site in a waiting list. It then 
dynamically computes an aggregate spoof value of the 
site based on the report frequency and the client side 
spoof value. If the aggregate spoof value crosses a 
threshold, the sever moves the web site into a 
dangerous list and informs web-proxies to block it. The 
central server maintains and updates white and black 
lists based on clients’ reports and other sources of 
information. 
In the following, we describe the technical details 
for both the web proxy and the central server. 
 
3.2. Web proxy 
 
      The basic operations of the web proxy are depicted 
in the flow chart below. There are various methods that 
attackers can use to produce misleading URLs. For 
example, a ‘@’ in a URL causes the string to the left to 
be disregarded, with the string on the right treated as 
the actual URL for retrieving a web page. Combined 
with the limited size of the browser address bar, it is 
easy to write URLs that appear legitimate within the 
address bar, but actually cause the browser to retrieve a 
page from an arbitrary site. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Operational flow chart of the web 
proxy. 
 
Upon extracting a domain name from the URL, the 
web proxy checks it against a local black list and a 
white list. Customized versions of the black and white 
lists are stored on the client side while the full lists are 
kept by the central server. The web proxy blocks the 
web site if the domain name is in the black list. On the 
other hand, if the domain name is in the white list, the 
proxy proceeds to check the validity of the 
corresponding IP address. 
The client as well as the central server maintains a 
database of <domain name, IP addresses> for all 
domain names in the white list. Every time a user 
wants to navigate to a web site the proxy checks the IP 
address of the domain name against the database. If the 
IP address is not in the database, then there is a 
possibility of DNS-hijack attack. We force the browser 
to use the most-recently-used IP address in the 
database instead of the suspicious IP address.  
In the event that the domain name is not in both 
black and white lists, the web proxy scores the web site 
using a combination of the URL read, domain 
similarity check, certificate check, link check, image 
check and post data check. The scoring results are 
reflected in spoof value SC which is calculated using 
the a standard aggregation function [4]. 
Domain similarity check finds out how closely the 
domain of a page resembles a standard or previously 
visited domain. As in [4], we compare domains by 
Hamming (edit) Distance using the Levenshtein 
algorithm (http://www.merriampark.com/ld.htm). For 
example ebay.com will raise the domain check if 
ebey.com is in the file of commonly spoofed sites or in 
the user history. During the link check, links contained 
in a page are examined. The link check fails for a page 
if at least one-fourth of the links fail the URL check 
described above. 
Spoof sites usually contain images taken from the 
honest site. For example, the eBay logo may appear on 
spoofed eBay pages to give the user the impression 
that they are communicating with eBay. If the eBay 
logo appears on a login page unrelated to eBay, that 
page is suspicious. The same applies to other 
identifiably eBay-specific images such as banners and 
buttons. We note that corporate logos often 
legitimately appear on many e-commerce sites (e.g., 
the Amazon logo appears on sites that sell products 
through Amazon) and therefore we only count this test 
for pages that ask for private user input. What if the 
spoof page contains a slight modification of the real 
image? The image comparison test might fail to detect 
the spoof. Fortunately, as noted earlier, attackers often 
directly copy or link to images on the honest site. 
Nevertheless, Small image modification can be 
defended by storing an image hash rather than the 
actual image [4]. Image hashing refers to a hashing 
algorithm that produces the same hash for similar 
images.  
The spoof value SC obtained above is compared 
with a pre-specified threshold value TC. If the spoof 
value exceeds the threshold, the web proxy generates a 
report including the suspicious URL (and domain 
name), the spoof value SC and possibly some other 
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information to the central sever. If the proxy gets the 
server’s response in real time, the response is returned 
to the user. Otherwise, the proxy generates a warning 
signal to the user. 
Experience shows that most users just ignore 
warning provided by anti-phishing systems and 
continue to surf the net.  In our design, the system 
warns its user when it is not able to decide if a 
suspicious site is a spoof or not. Instead of just giving a 
simple warning, our system provides alternative web 
sites and mixes them with the original URL the user 
tries to navigate. The combined list of web sites is then 
presented to the user for him to pick his choice. We 
believe this will be more effective to prevent spoof 
since the user is forced to identify the web site he 
wants to visit. When the system is sure that a site is 
indeed a spoof , it forcefully stops the navigation to the 
web site, blocks the spoof page, and gives a detailed 
report about this web site to explain why it is spoof.   
 
3.3. Central server 
 
The main functionality of the central server is to 
maintain a database of black and white lists of web 
sites. Phishing sites do not last for a long time, 
normally from a few hours to a few days; therefore, the 
database, especially the black list, needs to be updated 
regularly. The server performs this update of the 
database through the following means. 
First, the central server updates its database of black 
and white lists based on data from trusted third parties, 
such as Digital PhishNet and Anti-Phishing Working 
Group.  
Second, legitimate web sites are provided with a 
trusted channel to report their existences to the central 
server. The central server then verifies the legitimacy 
of the reports and updates its database of white list and 
black list accordingly.  
Third, the central server updates its database of 
black and white lists based on client reports. Upon 
receiving the first client report on a suspicious web 
site, the central server puts the reported web site in a 
waiting list, continues to monitor client reports on the 
web site and computes an aggregated spoof value of 
the suspicious web site. The aggregated spoof value, 
denoted SS(t), is the moving average of all spoof values 
reported by clients over an interval [t – T, t], where T 
is the size of the sliding time window and t is the 
current time. The aggregated spoof value SS(t) is 
compared with a pre-defined threshold TS. If the value 
is less than the threshold, the server will continue 
monitor client reports; once the aggregated spoof value 
exceeds the threshold, the suspicious web site is moved 
from the waiting list into a dangerous list. Web sites in 
the dangerous list will be further checked through other 
means, such as by checking with other trusted third 
parties. Until the status of a suspicious web site in the 
dangerous list is confirmed, the web site is treated as a 
spoof site and clients are informed to block the web 
site. The above process is shown in Figure 2. To 
prevent denial of service attack and spoofing attack, 
the central server digitally signs its reply to clients. 
Upon receiving a reply from the server, a client verifies 
the server’s signature using an embedded server public 
key. 
The central server is also designed to counter DNS-
hijack attacks. First, the central server finds and 
verifies IP addresses of a web sites via trust third party 
services such as trusted domain name servers. Second, 
the central server’s database records not only domain 
names of legitimate web sites, but also their 
corresponding IP addresses based on the fact that most 
of the sites with high reputation use a fixed set of IP 
addresses. 
 
Get the report
Check white/black 
list
Send the answer to 
client
Put it into waiting list and 
compute the summer of  
URL’s value
SS(t) >TS
Put it into 
dangerous list and 
tell client to block 
the site
Yes
Not sure
sure
        
 
Figure 2. Operational flow chart of the central 
server. 
 
4. Discussion and comparison 
 
There are many anti-phishing tools available to 
detect phishing attacks. Some are built into browsers, 
and some are built as add-ons in the form of toolbars. 
In the first large-scale, comprehensive study comparing 
leading anti-phishing technologies, 3Sharp LLC tested 
eight browser-based products to evaluate their overall 
accuracy in catching 100 live confirmed phishing 
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websites over a six week period (May – July 2006) 
[14]. The toolbar and browser solutions tested 
including EarthLink, eBay, GeoTrust, Google Safe 
Browsing using Firefox, McAfee SiteAdvisor, 
Microsoft Internet Explorer 7, Netcraft, and Netscape. 
Results from the study place Microsoft Internet 
Explorer 7’s anti-phishing technology at the top of the 
list as the most accurate, which is based on its ability to 
warn users about actual phishing sites while 
minimizing warning or block errors on legitimate 
website. Hence, we compare our system with 
Microsoft Phishing Filter in IE 7 in this section. 
The Microsoft Phishing Filter uses a combination of 
dynamic reputation services from the industry and 
machine-learning heuristics to help deliver a robust 
anti-phishing solution for the browser. Microsoft has 
the advantage of having a very large data set of 
resources to draw from. On the technology side, they 
use white list and black list and heuristics on both the 
client and the server.  
The Microsoft Phishing Filter is a two-stage 
warning system. The first level of warning (yellow) 
signals to users when the Phishing Filter detects a web 
site which contains characteristics similar to a phishing 
site. It recommends the user not to enter his or her 
personal information on the site. The second level of 
warning (red) automatically blocks users from a web 
site if it has been confirmed as a reported phishing site. 
Microsoft only tells users that a site is suspicious on 
the first level, but does not provide possible sites which  
users  should go to. In our system, when a user meets a 
suspicious site, the system provides users a set of 
legitimate sites which are the most close to the 
suspicious site. Although Microsoft’s Phishing Filter 
detects a phishing site and blocks it in the second level, 
it only tells users that it is a “phishing” site. Some 
users may not know the meaning of “phishing” and 
therefore simply ignore the warning. In our system, we 
incorporate warnings in the working flow so that they 
are not bypassed by users. 
Microsoft’s IE 7 employs heuristics on the server 
side and uses human operators to check the site. 
Microsoft updates its white and black lists mainly 
based on information from its industry and government 
collaborators, such as Digital PhishNet; it does not 
make use of information from its users. In our system, 
when the client meets a suspicious site, it uses  
heuristics to compute a spoof value for the site. It then 
sends the spoof value and the URL to the central 
server.  The central server computes an aggregated 
spoof value based on reported spoof values by clients 
and as well as the number of reports over a sliding time 
window. The suspicious site is blocked if the 
aggregated spoof value is above a threshold value.  We 
remark that the aggregated value is proportional to the 
client spoof values and to the number of reports in a 
given time interval. This approach makes sense since 
most phishing web sites are short lived, target at 
reputable web sites and the number of visits to 
phishing sites are highly bursty in nature. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We introduced an information-sharing based anti-
phishing system. The system has a client side proxy, 
installed as a plug-in to browsers, decides on the 
legitimacy of the web site based on a combination of 
white list, black list and heuristics. In case the client 
side proxy does not have sufficient information to 
make a clear judgment, it reports the suspicious site to 
a central server which then computes an aggregated 
spoof value of the suspicious web site and takes 
appropriate actions accordingly. The algorithms for 
computing spoof values and setting threshold values 
for both client proxy and the central server are critical 
in affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
system. We are currently implementing the proposed 
system into a prototype. Our next step is to conduct 
user experiments to further refine our design. 
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